Political representation and effects of municipal mergers by Harjunen, Oskari et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Representation and Effects of Municipal Mergers* 
Oskari Harjunena 
Tuukka Saarimaab 
Janne Tukiainenc 
 
Abstract 
We study the effects of municipal mergers using novel geocoded data on local public sector 
jobs and local politicians’ place of residence. We find that the mergers had no effects on 
municipal expenditures overall after eight years. However, the mergers led to highly unequal 
geographic political representation in the post-merger councils among the merged 
municipalities. Small and politically marginalized municipalities experienced a substantial 
reduction in local public jobs in administration and health and social care services relative to 
the municipalities with stronger representation. Development of house prices suggest that the 
quality of the service-tax bundle deteriorated in these politically marginalized municipalities. 
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1. Introduction  
Policy-makers often see municipal mergers as an effective way of realizing economies of 
scale in municipal service provision. Other perceived benefits from larger local jurisdictions 
include the internalization of inter-jurisdictional spillovers and an increased fiscal capacity to 
sustain expenditure or revenue shocks. With these goals mind, municipal merger reforms 
have been implemented over time in a vast number of countries. For example, Blom-Hansen 
et al. (2016) report that since the 1950’s extensive merger reforms have taken place in 28 
developed countries. The academic literature offers a more nuanced view by highlighting the 
potential costs of merging. These costs include larger mismatch between local services and 
the preferences of local citizens (Alesina and Spolaore 1997), less beneficial competition 
among jurisdictions (Tiebout 1956; Besley and Case 1995; Grossman et al. 2017) and weaker 
accountability, voter efficacy and trust, and lower participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Dahl 
and Tufte 1973; Oliver 2000; Treisman 2007; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Koch and Rochat 
2017). 
We study the effects of municipal mergers on municipal expenditures and the 
geography of municipal services by using novel geocoded data on local public sector jobs 
(250 m x 250 m grids covering the whole country) and local politicians’ place of residence 
(residential address) in Finland. These data enable us to study what happens to municipal 
service provision at the pre-merger municipality level, even when the official statistics on 
municipal expenditures are produced only at the post-merger municipality level after 
merging. We also analyze the within-merger heterogeneity of the effects with respect to the 
geographic distribution of political power within the merged municipalities.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we contribute to the small, but 
rapidly growing literature on the effects of municipal mergers (e.g. Reingewertz 2012; Blom-
Hansen et al. 2014; Blesse and Baskaran 2016; Allers and Geertsema 2016; Blom-Hansen et 
3 
 
al. 2016). To our knowledge, our study is the first to use data directly related to municipal 
service production at a more disaggregated level than the post-merger municipalities.1 This 
allows us to study the within-merger heterogeneity in the effects, a point of view currently 
missing from this literature. The importance of this aspect is highlighted in the theoretical 
literature on the optimal size of jurisdictions. As the size of the jurisdiction increases, the 
regional heterogeneity of the population increases, making it more difficult to tailor services 
to match the preferences of the citizens (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Ellingsen 1998).  
We are also able to study the effects on different types of municipal services as we can 
classify our job data into administration, schooling, and health and social care service jobs. 
As service production takes place at the site level, attaining scale economies requires merging 
the production units along with the municipalities (Miceli 1993; Blom-Hansen et al. 2016). 
Our data allows us to study whether and in what services this happens.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on political representation and distributive 
politics. In particular, our data on the exact place of residence of municipal councilors allow 
us to study how the merger effects depend on the geographic distribution of political power in 
the post-merger municipal council. Although the relationship between representation in 
legislatures and geographic distribution of public funds has received substantial attention in 
prior literature (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2002; Knight 2008; Berry at al. 2010; Albouy 2013; 
Hodler and Raschky 2014; Fiva and Halse 2016), the issue has eluded the research on 
municipal mergers. This is an important and somewhat surprising gap in the literature given 
that mergers typically lead to more heterogeneous municipal populations and have large 
impacts on the representation of different geographic voter groups (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 
2016). We are able to link these two literatures usually considered in isolation.  
                                                 
1 Egger et al. (2017) use geocoded light data to analyze changes in the overall economic activity within German 
mergers.  
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Our institutional setup also opens a new window into analyzing whether electoral 
incentives lead to local favoritism in at-large open-list PR systems.2 In the Finnish PR 
system, municipalities consist of a single district without geographic quotas, even after a 
merger. However, since the party lists are open and voting for an individual candidate is 
mandatory, candidates may have personal electoral incentives to cater to their local voters, 
even though the voters can vote for any candidate in the post-merger municipality. Studying 
the same mergers as the current paper, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2016) find that Finnish 
voters mostly keep on voting for the candidates from their home (pre-merger) municipality 
after a merger.3 This means that electoral incentives may be quite similar to those in the U.S. 
single member districts analyzed in much of the previous literature.  
Furthermore, over and above electoral incentives, local politicians have a stake in 
providing and maintaining the quality of local services as they themselves consume these 
services (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997). Previous evidence from 
Finnish local politics is consistent with this citizen-candidate framework as it shows that even 
individual councilors can influence local policy (Hyytinen et al. 2018). 
Our final contribution is methodological as the analysis of municipal merger effects 
comes with a number of challenges. The Finnish mergers were voluntarily decided by 
municipality councils, which makes causal inference challenging due to possible selection 
bias. However, the voluntary nature of the mergers is a blessing in disguise because it allows 
us to construct a sensible control group. Often in the case of forced mergers, the central 
government imposes a minimum population threshold that all municipalities need to fulfill 
through merging.4 While it is in some sense true that forcing all municipalities below a given 
                                                 
2 The closest related analysis from at-large PR systems concerns closed lists (Fiva and Halse 2016, Fiva et al. 
2018). 
3 Preference for local candidates has been documented in open-lists systems also in Estonia (Tavits 2010), 
Germany (Jankowski 2016) and Ireland (Gorecki and Marsh 2014). 
4 For example, in the Danish 2007 reform (Blom-Hansen et al. 2014 and Blom-Hansen et al. 2016) basically all 
municipalities with a population below 20,000 merged (compliance rate was 98 percent). Similar population 
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threshold to merge rules out selection bias, it does so by effectively washing away the entire 
relevant control group in difference-in-differences (DID) designs. The treatment group (small 
municipalities that had to merge) is very different from the control group (large 
municipalities that did not have to merge) by construction.  
To address the selection issue, we combine nearest neighbor matching with DID 
methods and adjust them for merger analysis as there are at least two partners in each merger. 
We are interested in causal effects working both at the merger and at the pre-merger 
municipality level. In the former, we want to compare a group of municipalities that merged 
to a group with the same number of municipalities with similar characteristics that did not 
merge. In the latter, the comparison of interest is either between merged municipalities with 
different levels of political representation or between merged municipalities and 
municipalities that did not merge, but could have been a part of a similar merger. 
We construct a control group by first simulating all possible spatially contiguous 
mergers involving up to ten municipalities (ten being the largest actual merger) that could 
have taken place according to the pre-merger municipality borders (after omitting actual 
mergers). We then build the control group from this universe of hypothetical mergers using 
nonparametric nearest neighbor matching based on merger level characteristics measured 
before merging. In the pre-merger municipality level analysis, we decompose the 
hypothetical mergers in the control group back to the municipality level. This has the 
advantage of allowing us to conduct placebo tests with respect to heterogeneity in the effects 
within the hypothetical mergers. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. During an 8-year follow-up period after 
merging, total municipal expenditures evolve in the same way on average in the merged 
municipalities as in the control group of hypothetical mergers that did not take place. These 
                                                                                                                                                        
thresholds set by the central government were used during the Swedish (Hinnerich 2009) and the German 
(Blesse and Baskaran 2016) merger reforms among others. 
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zero findings are consistent with prior evidence concerning voluntary mergers decided at the 
local level (Moisio and Uusitalo 2013; Allers and Geertsema 2016; Blesse and Baskaran 
2016). However, these merger-level findings hide substantial heterogeneity within the 
mergers. First, the mergers led to highly unequal geographic political representation in the 
post-merger municipal councils among the merged municipalities. Second, while nothing 
happened to the number of jobs in schooling, the number of local public jobs in 
administration and in the health and social care services decreased substantially in the 
politically marginalized (pre-merger level) municipalities relative to those municipalities that 
were more strongly represented in the post-merger councils. In fact, the jobs in the latter two 
sectors increased somewhat in the politically stronger municipalities.  
As we do not have quasi-experimental variation in political representation, we need to 
be careful with the interpretation of the results. The alternative explanation is that due to 
economies of scale it makes sense to concentrate some services to larger municipalities and 
downsize facilities in smaller ones. We subject political representation and economies of 
scale measures to a horse race. This analysis suggests that administrative jobs are centralized 
to the largest municipality in the merger regardless of representation, while representation is 
connected to the relocation of health and social care services. We also detect divergence in 
house prices between the politically marginalized municipalities and the municipalities with 
stronger representation suggesting that the quality of the service-tax bundle deteriorated in 
the smaller merger partners. Overall, the results survive a large number of validity checks 
detailed later on.  
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2. Institutional background 
2.1. Finnish municipalities 
Municipal tasks: Finland has a two-tier system of government consisting of the central 
government and municipalities.5 In international comparison, Finnish municipalities have 
extensive tasks and fiscal autonomy. In addition to local public goods and services, 
municipalities are responsible for providing most of social and health care services along 
with primary and secondary schooling. The GDP share of municipality spending is roughly 
18 percent and they employ around 20 percent of the total workforce.  
Revenue sources: The most important revenue sources are local taxes and operating 
revenues, such as fees. The local income tax rate is flat and the municipalities can set the rate 
freely. In addition, municipalities get revenue from the local property tax and they receive a 
share of the state level corporate tax revenue. In 2012, the average share of the income tax of 
total revenue was 46 percent, while the shares of the property and corporate taxes were only 3 
percent, respectively. Regional tax base and cost disparities are offset by a central 
government block grant system. The grants cover about 20 percent of total municipal 
revenues, but this share varies considerably across municipalities.  
Municipal politics: Finland has a proportional representation (PR) system with eight 
parties that dominate national and municipal politics. Municipal councils are the main seat of 
power in the municipal decision-making and the council term lasts for four years. During our 
analysis period, the council size was a step function of population and varied between 13 and 
85. The merged municipalities were allowed to have a larger council size than the law 
dictated for the first post-merger election term. The elections in October 2008 already used 
the new post-merger municipal division, although the mergers came to effect at the start of 
2009.  
                                                 
5 Technically, there is a middle-tier consisting of counties, which do not, however, have major tasks or elected 
officials.   
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Each municipality has only one electoral district (i.e. constituency) and no geographic 
quotas are in place, even after a merger. The municipal elections use an open-list method 
where voting for a single individual candidate is mandatory. Party vote is calculated as the 
sum over its candidates’ votes. Council seats are allocated to parties based on the party vote 
shares in accordance with competitive indices set by the d’Hondt method. Personal votes 
determine the position of the candidates within the party list. The candidates from smaller 
merger partners have to compete with candidates from the larger partners within the new 
party lists, which may lead to political marginalization of the small merging municipalities.  
Parties do not typically form stable ruling coalitions in municipal councils. Instead, 
majority coalitions are often formed on issue basis. Moreover, party discipline is less strict at 
the local level than in the national parliament (see e.g. Hyytinen et al. 2014). In this 
environment, regional political representation can play a role in municipal decision-making 
either directly through coalition formation across party lines or by influencing within-party 
positions (Laver and Shepsle 1990). In both situations, having more councilors from their 
home (pre-merger) municipality should be beneficial to voters.  
2.2. The merger reform 
In 2005, the central government initiated a plan aiming to make the production of 
municipal services more efficient and increasing the fiscal and service provision capacity of 
the municipalities. The reasons behind the reform included aging related expected increase in 
municipal expenditures and disparities in municipal revenues due to urbanization. Voluntary 
mergers were the main tool for reaching these goals. 
The central government encouraged mergers using three policy instruments. First, 
central government grants were not decreased during the first five years after merging. 
Second, municipalities were not allowed to lay-off their permanent employees during the first 
five post-merger years. Third, the central government granted merger subsidies to merged 
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municipalities. The mergers in 2008 and 2009 received larger subsidies than the subsequent 
ones, possibly explaining why most mergers took place in 2009. On average, the merger 
subsidy was about 330 Euros per capita. The subsidy was paid in three annual instalments 
after the merger.  
Municipal councils vote for a specific merger proposal. If the proposed merger gains a 
majority in all the participating councils, the merger goes through. If not, it is cancelled and 
all the municipalities continue as they were or a subset of the municipalities in the original 
plan merges. In 2006, there were 431 municipalities in total. Following the central 
government plan, 14 mergers took place in 2007, 1 in 2008 and 32 in 2009 reducing the 
number of municipalities to 348 (see Fig. 1). The number of municipalities involved in a 
given merger ranged from 2 to 10 municipalities. 
We concentrate on the mergers that took place in 2009, which are highlighted in the 
map in Fig. 1. We exclude three of the 32 mergers that took place in 2009 from our analysis 
because they were part of another merger just before or after 2009. We focus on the 2009 
mergers, because for the earlier mergers, the 2008 elections may have been affected by the 
mergers, and because for the later ones the post-treatment period is too short, given the 
restrictions on lay-offs. 
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) describe the determinants of these mergers and find 
that fiscal pressure, existing cooperation in service production, citizens’ residential location 
and local democracy considerations are associated the merger decisions. Hyytinen et al. 
(2014) find that also councilors' re-election concerns play an important role. Due to the 
identification strategy in Hyytinen et al. (2014), the political drivers of mergers they 
document are orthogonal to economic development. Therefore, at least some part of the 
decisions to merge can be seen as exogenous for our purposes. Nonetheless, the voluntary 
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has to be geographically contiguous. Second, we allow mergers to take place only within 
county borders because none of the actual mergers crossed these borders (see Fig. 1).7 
Finally, to rule out contamination of the control group, we omit all those mergers that 
included at least one municipality that actually underwent a merger in the period 2005–2015.  
After these restrictions, we are left with 7,965 hypothetical mergers (see Table A1 in 
supporting information).8 We then use a nearest neighbor matching algorithm based on 
merger level characteristics from the pre-merger period to find controls for the actual 
mergers. We use exact matching with respect to number of municipalities in the merger.9 For 
example, for a merger including, say, four municipalities we pick five control mergers among 
those hypothetical mergers that also include four municipalities.10 This ensures that the 
control cases have as many administration facilities (four town halls) and personnel (four 
mayors) as the treated unit had prior to merging.  
Within these merger size groups, matching is based on the following covariates: total 
population of the merger, median distance of the citizens to the business center of the largest 
municipality in the merger, indicator for whether all the partners belong to the same health 
care cooperation unit, and within-merger heterogeneity in per capita taxable income, 
expenditures and deficit. These variables should reflect the potential for economies of scale, 
and the differences between citizen’s preferences and the financial situation of the 
municipalities in a merger. Moreover, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) found that most of 
                                                 
7 We omit the counties of Kainuu and Lapland, which are highlighted in Fig. 1. Kainuu was experimenting with 
a county level administration of health and social care services during the merger wave. Lapland is an outlier 
with geographically large and sparsely populated municipalities. There were no mergers in these counties in 
2009. 
8 All of these mergers cannot take place simultaneously in reality because an individual municipality may be 
involved in more than one of them.  
9 We use the teffects nnmatch command in STATA where the matches are sampled with replacement. We use 
the command only to construct the control group and do not use it in the estimation as we rely on DID 
estimation, want to allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effect and analyze the effects at the pre-merger 
municipality level. 
10 The choice of the number of control units is arbitrary and driven by the somewhat limited number of treated 
units. The optimal number of controls involves a standard bias-variance trade-off: Fewer controls means that 
they are more similar to the actual mergers, but this may lead to imprecise estimates.  
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these variables had predictive power in explaining the merger decisions. The matching 
variables are measured in 2006.11  
We use this control group also in the pre-merger municipality level analysis, in which 
we simply decompose the hypothetical mergers back to the municipality level. This has the 
advantage of allowing us to conduct placebo tests with respect to heterogeneity in the effects 
within the hypothetical mergers. Furthermore, matching on pre-determined variables is the 
only way to control for systematic differences in observables, because we cannot measure 
these variables at the pre-merger municipality level after merging, and thus, cannot directly 
use control variables. Matching on pre-determined variables also minimizes the risk of 
including bad controls (or alternative outcomes) into the regressions. 
3.2. Data 
Merger level: Table 1 presents descriptive pre-merger statistics on the mergers and the 
control group based on nearest neighbor matching. The potential mergers in the control group 
are slightly larger in terms of total population than the actual mergers. Otherwise, the 
matching algorithm produces a comparable control group in terms of pre-merger 
characteristics. The magnitude of the mean differences is small and only the difference in 
house prices is statistically significant at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 As the 2009 mergers were decided mostly in 2007, the 2006 information is likely to be the latest that was 
available when mergers were decided. Many of the matching variables do not vary over time. For those that do, 
we have checked that the matching covariates follow the same pre-treatment time trend in the control and 
treatment groups. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for merger level data in 2006. 
  Merger = 0 Merger = 1 
p-value   Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Number of observations 145 29   
Number of municipalities 3.17 1.75 3.17 1.77   
Merger population 43 470 35 233 35 643 34 707 0.275 
Median distance (km) 18.9 9.2 17.4 9.9 0.431 
Expenditures (€ per capita) 4 563 419 4 669 475 0.226 
Operating margin (€ per capita) -3 683 255 -3 693 347 0.862 
Tax rate (%) 18.9 0.4 18.7 0.8 0.101 
Taxable income (€ per capita) 11 330 1 675 11 759 1 643 0.209 
Central government grants (€ per capita) 1 373 454 1 266 522 0.260 
Cooperation (0/1) 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.51 0.733 
Merger subsidy (€ per capita) 277.9 162.9 329.3 219.8 0.147 
Log house prices (€/m2) 6.99 0.26 7.09 0.23 0.090 
Note: The data come from Statistics Finland. The last column reports the p-value from a t-test on the equality of 
means. For house prices, the number of observations is 139 and 24, respectively. The merger subsidies for the 
control group calculated using the subsidy scheme and illustrate the amount of subsidy these hypothetical 
mergers would have received had they merged in 2009.   
 
Pre-merger municipality level: We are also interested in within-merger heterogeneity 
of the effects and whether the effects depend on the political representation in the post-
merger councils. This analysis is possible due to high quality GIS data that allow us to 
aggregate spatial micro data to match the pre-merger municipality borders. These data come 
from three sources.  
First, we have obtained the exact address of all the municipal councilors from the 
Population Register Center. These data allow us to calculate the seat shares at the pre-merger 
municipality level in the post-merger municipal councils, which we use as a treatment 
variable.  
Second, we use the Community Structure Database produced by the Finnish 
Environment Institute and Statistics Finland. This geocoded database covers the whole of 
Finland in 250 m x 250 m grids, which include information on the number of jobs in different 
sectors located in the grids. The data are available for the years 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2015. They allow us to analyze the development of these jobs 
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through time regardless of the redrawing of municipal borders. Unfortunately, we cannot 
categorize the jobs into municipal and other jobs. We use the following four job categories: 
public administration and defense, health and social care, schooling, and employees from all 
other sectors. The first three categories are our main job outcomes while the latter can be 
used in placebo tests because mergers should not have a sizable direct effect on these jobs, 
although an indirect effect is possible. Schooling and health and social care are the most 
important expenditure and employment categories as they make up some 70 percent of all 
municipal expenditures.   
The problem with these categories is that some of these jobs may, in fact, be in the 
private sector (especially in health care) or in central government (obviously defense, but also 
some schooling because of universities). These jobs should not, however, confound our 
analysis as long as there are no changes in these jobs that coincide with the timing of the 
mergers. In practice, this means that jobs in the military, private sector health care firms and 
in universities need to develop smoothly through the merger reform. If this is the case, the 
DID strategy produces a causal effect on municipal jobs, i.e. any changes in the number of 
these jobs can quite safely be interpreted as changes in municipal jobs.12 
Finally, as a proxy for the quality of the service-tax bundle, we use house transaction 
data at the zip-code level obtained from Statistics Finland. As zip-codes remain unchanged 
throughout the merger process, we can follow average house prices per square meter at the 
pre-merger municipality level.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables using the matched data at the 
pre-merger municipality level. The municipalities are divided into four groups for illustrative 
purposes. First is the control of group municipalities that did not merge. Second, since our 
                                                 
12 We have interviewed management from the two leading private sector heath care providers in Finland: 
Terveystalo (Päivi Metsäniemi, Chief physician) and Attendo Finland (Lauri Korkeaoja, Director of 
Communications and PR). They communicated to us that the location decisions by their firms have been 
independent of the municipal mergers and mostly independent of public sector providers’ decisions more 
generally.  
15 
 
interest lies on the effects of political representation, we have divided the merged 
municipalities into three equal-sized groups based on the council seat share they obtained in 
the first post-merger elections in 2008.13 These groups are used in the graphical DID 
analyses; whereas the continuous seat share variable is used in the corresponding regressions. 
According to Table 2, the political representation is highly unequal between the merged 
municipalities. The Weak group includes the municipalities with only a weak representation 
in the new council with an average seat share of only 6.4 percent. In the Medium group, the 
average seat share is 20.8, while in the Strong group this share is 62.9 percent on average. In 
fact, 75 percent of the municipalities in the Strong group had a majority of the council seats. 
We cannot divide the control group into these subgroups, because they obviously have not 
had joint post-merger elections. However, we use municipal population shares as proxies for 
the seat shares when conducting placebo analysis using this group. It is evident from Table 2 
that these two measures are highly correlated in the merger group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The correlation between seat shares in the first and second post-merger elections (2008 and 2012) is 0.98, so 
we use the first post-merger election results throughout our analysis. They are also pre-determined as the 
elections held in October 2008 already used the new post-merger municipal division, although the mergers came 
to effect at the start of 2009. The 2012 elections may have been influenced by the mergers, and thus, perhaps 
better serve as an alternative outcome than a treatment.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for pre-merger municipality level data in 2007. 
  No merger Weak Medium Strong 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD 
Number of observations 460 31 31 30 
Seat share in post-merger council 1.000 0.000 0.064 0.031 0.224 0.079 0.669 0.163 
Population 10,750 15,372 2,424 1,946 7,467 8,417 24,419 28,561
Population share in merger 0.257 0.211 0.054 0.032 0.209 0.077 0.695 0.187 
Jobs per capita:                 
Administration and defense 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.011 
Schooling 0.023 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.021 0.013 0.029 0.012 
Health and social care 0.050 0.018 0.043 0.022 0.047 0.020 0.067 0.022 
Other  0.232 0.074 0.168 0.043 0.219 0.076 0.274 0.076 
Notes: The Weak, Medium and Strong representation groups are constructed based on the pre-merger 
municipality level seat shares in the first post-merger municipal elections. 
 
3.3. Difference-in-differences estimation 
In addition to using a matching algorithm in constructing the control group, our 
identification strategy is based on the difference-in-differences method. We will rely heavily 
on graphical evidence, but we will also report regression results to assess the statistical 
significance of the results.  
When using the merger level data, we estimate the following type of DID models:  
 
2014
2009
,it t i j i j it
j
y merger merger year uα θ β δ
=
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ +   (1) 
where y is one of our outcomes of interest in merger i at time t. θt are year dummies. We are 
interested in the coefficients of the post-merger interaction terms merger·year.  
The model using pre-merger municipal level data and the seat shares takes the form: 
 
2014
2009
2014
2009
,
it t i i j i j
j
j i i j it
j
y merger seatshare merger year
merger seatshare year u
α θ β γ δ
μ
=
=
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ +


  (2) 
where the coefficients μ now captures any heterogeneous effects with respect to political 
representation. The council seat share measure is defined only for the municipalities that 
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actually merged and is set to zero for non-merged municipalities. Thus, we do not include the 
term i iseatshare merger⋅  or the terms 
2014
2009 i jj
seatshare year
=
⋅  into our estimation equation.  
The key concern is that selection issues may relate both to the decision to merge and to 
the extent of political representation within mergers. However, selection based on pre-
treatment differences in municipality characteristics does not bias the DID estimates as long 
as the common trends assumption holds. This assumption means that the outcomes would 
follow the same time trend in the control and treatment groups in the absence of treatment. 
We can indirectly test this assumption by analyzing pre-treatment trends using several 
comparisons: between mergers and non-mergers at the merger level, within mergers with 
respect to political representation at the pre-merger municipality level and between merged 
and non-merged municipalities of similar size at the pre-merger municipality level.  
In the municipality-level analysis, we use two-way clustered (municipality and merger) 
standard errors to account for within-merger and municipality level dependencies across time 
and within the control group (Bertrand et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2011). The within control 
group dependency arises naturally in our setting, because the nearest neighbor matching was 
done with replacement. In the merger-level analysis, we cluster at the merger level. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Merger level 
Fig. 2 presents the development of the means of per capita expenditures, operating margins14, 
tax rates and log house prices per square meter from 2000 to 2016. The comparison is 
between the actual mergers and the control group of hypothetical mergers based on nearest 
neighbor matching. The blue vertical lines highlight the post-merger period and the red 
                                                 
14 Operating margin measures the difference between operating revenues and operating costs. Some 
municipalities produce and sell services to other municipalities, which add noise to the expenditure measure. 
These services show up on the municipality’s expenditure side, but they also receive operating revenue from the 
sale of these services that needs to be netted-out.  
18 
 
vertical lines highlight when the 5-year layoff protection for municipal employees ended after 
the mergers, as we also want to understand whether removing this constraint affected the 
municipalities’ opportunities to cut expenditures. The corresponding regression results are 
reported in Table A2 in the supporting information. 
Based on visual inspection, the two groups follow a common pre-treatment trend in all 
outcomes.15 Formal tests presented in Table A3 in the supporting information, support this 
claim, especially after 2003. Moreover, the levels are almost identical due to our matching 
procedure.  
Did the mergers reduce municipal per capita expenditures? According to Fig. 2, the 
answer seems to be no. If anything, expenditures increase slightly faster initially in the 
merger group than in the control group, but in the longer term they converge.16 The 
regression results in Table A2 show that the effects are not statistically significant and small 
in magnitude.  
Interestingly, there is a small, but again temporary increase in operating margins and a 
drop in tax rates in the merger group. However, in the longer run, tax rates increase slightly in 
the mergers. Moreover, the temporary increase in expenditures that coincides with the small 
changes in tax rates and in operating margins can be explained by the merger subsidies. The 
merger subsidies were on average 330 Euros per capita and they were paid in three annual 
instalments during the first three post-merger years (2009, 2010 and 2011). Thus, the annual 
installments were quite small and short-term. Also tax rate harmonization within the mergers 
may play a role. However, we do not wish to draw too strong conclusions regarding these 
effects as they are quite small. For example, the tax rates decreased in the merger group by 
0.23 percentage points due to merging in the short run (2009), but increased by 0.39 
                                                 
15 As reported in Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015), who studied the anticipatory effects of the same merger 
reform from a common pool perspective, the small increase in expenditures in 2008 is due to common pool 
exploitation after mergers were agreed upon, but before they took place. 
16 Fig. A1 in the supporting information reports results using an alternative control group based on individual 
municipalities instead of hypothetical mergers. 
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percentage points in the long run (2016). These can be contrasted to the tax rate level in the 
merger group before the mergers in 2006 of 18.7% (see Table 1). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Graphical DID results with merger level data. 
Note: The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor matching algorithm. The blue 
vertical lines highlight the post-merger period and the red vertical lines the end of the 5-year layoff protection 
period for municipal employees.  
 
Based on the fiscal outcomes, it seems that the main goal of the policy-maker was not 
achieved.17 However, the fact that we do not find effects on expenditures does not necessarily 
mean that mergers had no effect on citizens’ welfare. For example, the merged municipalities 
may be able to produce higher quality services with the same expenditures than the 
municipalities that did not merge.  
Unfortunately, we do not have good data on service quality, and instead, we need to use 
indirect measures of the quality of the service-tax bundle. An often-used measure for this 
                                                 
17 We also analyzed between merger heterogeneity with respect to the number of municipalities in a merger, 
pre-merger cooperation among the merging municipalities and geographic compactness of the merger. We 
found no effects with respect to these merger subgroups. These results are available from the authors by request.  
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purpose is house prices. The idea is based on a revealed preference argument so that changes 
in the quality of the service-tax bundle should be reflected in the demand for housing in the 
municipality and in house prices in the short run. Based on Fig. 2, house prices diverge 
slightly between the two groups, but the results in Table A2 indicate that the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
4.2. Pre-merger municipality level 
The merger level analysis abstracts away from a number of interesting questions with 
respect to within-merger heterogeneity. For example, the services may be relocated to the 
largest municipality in the merger, but the overall service level, and thus, the expenditure 
level may remain the same. This may hurt the citizens in the smaller partner, but we would 
not be able to detect this from the merger level data.  
In this section, we use pre-merger level municipalities in the analysis and ask whether 
the effects of mergers vary across municipalities and whether they depend on political 
representation. In order to assess the results visually, we divide the merged municipalities 
into subgroups based on the (pre-merger) municipality level representation in the post-merger 
council as described in Table 2. The results are portrayed in Fig. 3, while Table A4 in the 
supporting information presents the corresponding regression results where the post-merger 
seat shares are used as a continuous treatment variable in a DID model presented in Eq. (2). 
Because of large differences in the number of total jobs, all the jobs are measured in per 
capita terms.18  
Fig. 3 also includes placebo tests with respect to treatment intensity using the 
municipalities in the control group. Since we do not have merger level elections for these 
municipalities, we divide the control group into subgroups based on their population share in 
their hypothetical merger. We divide the control group into three equal sized groups based on 
                                                 
18 The results are not driven by changes in population levels in the municipalities are they develop smoothly in 
all the municipality groups (Fig. A2 in the supporting information). 
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the population share and label these subgroups the same way as the merger subgroups (Weak, 
Medium and Strong) so that, for example, the Strong group includes the municipalities with 
the largest population share in their hypothetical merger. This division also gives us an 
additional counterfactual for the merged municipalities. Instead of comparing the merged 
municipalities with different levels of representation to the control group as a whole, we can 
compare the development of the outcomes in, say, the Weak group that merged and the Weak 
group that did not.  
According to Fig. 3, administrative jobs (top-left) clearly decrease in the municipalities 
with Weak and Medium representation in the council, whereas they initially slightly increase 
in the municipalities with Strong representation. This suggests that at least some of the 
municipal administration is concentrated to the largest municipality in the merger. For 
administration, pre-treatment common trends are not particularly clean visually, but the 
formal pre-treatment tests do not indicate a problem (see Table A5 in supporting information) 
and the largest changes clearly coincide with the mergers and these changes seem to be 
permanent. Furthermore, there are no changes in administrative jobs in the control group or in 
its subgroups that would coincide with the merger reform (top-right in Fig. 3).   
A similar pattern is evident in the health and social care sector jobs (middle-left in Fig. 
3). These jobs clearly decrease in the Medium group and even more so in the Weak 
representation group, while there is no visible change in the Strong group. The initial 
reduction is substantial and the divergence between the groups permanent. The common 
trends assumption seems quite plausible for this outcome based on the pre-treatment trends 
and formal tests (see Table A5 in supporting information). Moreover, these jobs develop 
smoothly throughout the analysis period in each of the population share subgroups in the 
control group (middle-right in Fig. 3) and the merged and non-merged municipalities have 
similar pre-treatment common trends in each group.  
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There seem to be no permanent effects in the schooling sector (bottom-left in Fig. 3). 
After a small initial decline, the number of jobs quickly returns to the pre-merger levels and 
the groups do not diverge permanently. Formal pre-treatment tests do not indicate any 
problems (see Table A5 in supporting information) and these jobs develop smoothly and with 
a similar pre-treatment trend also in the control group (bottom-right in Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
  
  
  
Fig. 3. Graphical DID results with pre-merger municipality level data.  
Notes: The left-hand side figures illustrate the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figures illustrate the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm. The blue vertical lines highlight the post-merger period and the red vertical lines the end of 
the 5-year layoff protection period for municipal employees.  
 
The regression results presented in Table A4 in the supporting information are in line 
with the graphical findings. The effects on administration and health and social care are 
substantial, persistent and also statistically highly significant. For example, in the first post-
merger year 2009 the health and social care jobs decrease by almost a third on average for the 
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municipalities in the Weak representation group (seat share equal to 6.4 percent on average) 
compared to 2007. The interpretation of the regression coefficients for Seat share is 
somewhat tricky because the treatment effect may be a combination of overall reductions in 
the number of jobs and a reshuffling of jobs within the mergers from politically marginalized 
municipalities to the larger ones. Thus, Fig. 3 and Table A4, give a correct picture of the 
availability of services at municipality level, but do not say anything about the total number 
of jobs.  
In order to check which the correct interpretation is, we calculated the number of total 
jobs in the merged municipalities before and after the mergers. The total number of health 
and social care jobs in the merged municipalities was 74,479 in 2007 and 74,329 in 2009. 
This suggests that the results are mostly due to reshuffling of these jobs from politically 
marginalized municipalities to the larger ones within the mergers. This is also in line with the 
zero effects on total expenditures. A plausible explanation is that some small local health care 
centers are closed and the employees are moved to health care centers in the municipality 
with more representation.  
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4.3. Discussion and validity checks 
Effects on welfare. One interpretation of the results so far is that the services that 
people use more or less every day (such as elementary schools) were not much affected by 
the mergers. These may also be services where economies of scale are not that important. At 
the same time, health care services are typically not used on a daily basis and it could be that 
there is a distance-quality trade-off related to these services. When a small municipality 
produces primary health care services, the facilities are close to the users, but service quality 
and variety may be low in small production units. Perhaps, the merger made it possible for 
people in the smaller municipalities to gain access to better quality and larger variety of 
health services further away, without excessive tax increases. To shed light on these issues, 
we again turn to house prices as a proxy measure of the quality of the tax-service bundle.  
The problem in using house price data at the pre-merger municipality level is that the 
number of housing transactions per year is small in the smallest municipalities. Having only a 
few housing transactions in a given year would not give us a reliable measure of the quality 
of life in the municipality. In order to get reliable results, we have constrained the sample so 
that a municipality is included in the analysis only if there are least ten transactions per year 
during the whole 2000–2015 period in the municipality. For the visual inspection of the 
house price development, we combine the Medium and Weak representation groups. The 
combined Medium and Weak group contains 20 municipalities in total (16 Medium and 4 
Weak). This has the clear disadvantage that we effectively drop many of the municipalities 
that had the largest reductions in health and social care jobs making it more difficult to detect 
any effects.  
Fig. 4 presents the development of house prices (log price per square meter) in the 
representation subgroups and the population share subgroups of the control group. Table A6 
in the supporting information reports the corresponding regression results. From the left panel 
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of Fig. 4, it is evident that house prices follow a rather clean pre-treatment common trend, 
confirmed by formal pre-treatment tests (see Table A7 in supporting information). After 
merging, house prices diverge between the Strong and the combined group of Medium and 
Weak representation municipalities. The combined Medium and Weak group diverges also 
from the control group from 2012 onwards. The differences are statistically significant from 
2013 onwards as can be seen from Table A6. At face value, this result means that the mergers 
were, at least to some extent, harmful to the residents in the politically marginalized 
municipalities.19 
 
    
Fig. 4. House prices at pre-merger municipality level. 
Note: The left-hand side figure illustrates the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figure illustrates the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm. Due to small number of observations in the Weak representation group, Medium and Weak groups 
are combined in the figure. The blue vertical lines highlight the post-merger period and the red vertical lines the 
end of the 5-year layoff protection period for municipal employees.  
 
The right panel of Fig. 4 shows that also the population share subgroups exhibit 
common pre-treatment trends (see Table A7) and develop quite similarly after the merger 
reform. The groups diverge slightly in the last two years, but the DID estimates are not 
statistically significant (see Table A6).This finding together with the small number of 
                                                 
19 This is unlikely to be driven by changes in the quality composition of the transacted units. Fig. A3 in the 
supporting information shows that the share of multi-story apartments of total transactions and the average 
number of rooms in the transactions involving apartments do not change over time.  
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transactions from the Weak representation group implies that we should treat these results 
and their interpretation with respect to welfare with some caution.  
Validity checks. We have conducted two sets of additional validity checks. The results 
for these additional checks are presented and discussed in Appendix B in the supporting 
information.  First, we show in Fig. B1 in the supporting information, that nothing happened 
to private sector jobs in any of the representation subgroups or in the control group and its 
subgroups. This adds credibility to our results as it suggests that the different-sized merged 
municipalities are in the same business cycle with respect to labor market outcomes. 
The second set of validity checks addresses the interpretation of the results with respect 
to political representation, the alternative interpretation being that service relocation happens 
because of economies of scale or that services are centralized to the largest municipality in 
the merger. The results suggest that administrative jobs are centralized to the largest 
municipality in the merger regardless of representation, while representation is connected to 
the relocation of health and social care services. We acknowledge that even with these 
additional results, we cannot claim to have a bulletproof identification of the political 
representation effects.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We have analyzed the effects of municipal mergers using novel geocoded data on 
municipal services and local politicians place of residence. We find that the mergers had 
practically no effects on total expenditures. This result is in line with previous research that 
shows that voluntary mergers are unlikely to result in cost savings. However, these aggregate 
effects hide interesting patterns within the mergers indicating that the benefits and costs of 
merging are distributed unevenly within the mergers. The municipalities who were politically 
marginalized in the post-merger council experienced a substantial reduction in local public 
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jobs in health and social care sectors relative to the municipalities with stronger 
representation. Furthermore, analysis of house price development provides suggestive 
evidence that merging and the resulting political marginalization was harmful to the residents 
of these small municipalities.  
It seems plausible that our results generalize at least to countries with a similar political 
system and public services at the local level. Furthermore, considering the extent of the 
literature from many different countries and political systems concerning the relationship 
between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of public funds, we 
believe that the effects documented in this paper are not specific to Finland. At the same time, 
the details of the political system may affect how unequal the geographic representation 
becomes after a merger reform, and thus, the subsequent effects on service availability within 
the merged municipalities. The key features of election systems, such as ballot type, election 
formula, and district number and magnitude, are likely to affect regional representation in 
subtle ways as they shape the incentives and actions of all political actors (Duverger 1954 
and Taagepera and Shugart 1989).  
Our results speak to the literatures that have examined the effects of redrawing 
jurisdictional boundaries and the effects of political representation, and also inform the policy 
debate on the effects of merging local jurisdictions. Compared to prior literature on the 
effects of municipal mergers, our results paint a more nuanced picture of what happens to 
municipal services and how these effects are tied to the political representation at the local 
level. The increased regional inequality that we document cannot be detected by simply 
comparing merged and non-merged municipalities meaning that the prior literature misses an 
important aspect of merger reforms. As better spatial data become more broadly available, 
analyzing the within-merger effects in other countries with the methodological refinements 
introduced in this paper seems like a fruitful avenue for further research.  
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In addition to pointing out new directions in how to evaluate merger reforms, our 
results suggest that political representation should feature more prominently in the planning 
stages of merger reforms. These reforms are often unpopular among the electorate and our 
results together with those by, e.g., Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) indicate that concerns for 
deteriorating local democracy and representation are important. Our study shows that if major 
merger reforms are planned without carefully considering local political representation, there 
may be unanticipated and undesired outcomes on regional equality.  
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